The Dose of the Threat Makes the Resistance for Cooperation by Cetin, Uzay & Bingol, Haluk O.
The Dose of the Threat Makes the Resistance for Cooperation
Uzay Cetin∗ and Haluk O. Bingol
Department of Computer Engineering, Bogazici University.
(Dated: November 10, 2018)
We propose to reformulate the payoff matrix structure of Prisoner’s Dilemma Game, by introduc-
ing threat and greed factors, and show their effect on the co-evolution of memory and cooperation.
Our findings are as follows. (i) Memory protects cooperation. (ii) To our surprise, greater memory
size is unfavorable to evolutionary success when there is no threat. In the absence of threat, sub-
sequent generations lose their memory and are consequently invaded by defectors. (iii) In contrast,
the presence of an appropriate level of threat triggers the emergence of a self-protection mechanism
for cooperation, which manifests itself as an increase in memory size within subsequent generations.
On the evolutionary level, memory size acts like an immune response of the generations against
aggressive defection. (iv) Even more extreme threat results again in defection. Our findings boil
down to the following: The dose of the threat makes the resistance for cooperation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Taking cooperative actions against a common threat,
is frequently seen in nature and in history as well. Her-
bert Spencer puts it as follows, “Only by imperative need
for combination in war were primitive men led into co-
operation” [1]. Individuals, as a response to what they
perceive as threat, bind together and tend to move as
a unit. Similar collective spirit, can also be seen in fish
swimming in schools or birds flying in flocks. The waves
of agitation in schools or flocks are nothing but an es-
cape maneuver from an attack of a predator [2]. Kin
selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, group
selection and limited local interactions are shown to be
five powerful determinants of cooperation [3, 4]. Yet,
explaining cooperation still remains one of the greatest
challenges across disciplines [5]. Here, we discuss the dose
of the threat imposed by environment as another way to
obtain cooperation.
In Ref [6], Robert Wright says, “interaction among
individual genes, or cells, or animals, among inter-
est groups, or nations, or corporations, can be viewed
through the lenses of game theory”. Nevertheless, the
amount of information stemming from the huge number
of interactions, can easily exceed the processing capa-
bilities of the interacting parties. This is also referred
as attention scarcity problem in the literature [7, 8]. In
our previous work, we coined the term Attention Game
to define an interacting environment where players can
only pay attention to a portion of the information they
receive [9]. We worked on attention games in a specific
context of Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD).
Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game is a standard model,
described by the payoff matrix shown in Fig. 1a, to study
how selfish beings manage to cooperate [10]. There are
two types of actions, namely, cooperation (C ) and defec-
tion (D). Two agents select their actions to play against
each other. In the case of mutual cooperation, both re-
ceive the reward payoff R. If one cooperates while the
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other defects, cooperator gets the sucker payoff S and
defector gets the temptation payoff T . In the case of mu-
tual defection, both get the punishment payoff P . To
be an Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game, the following
conditions must hold for the payoffs: S < P < R < T
and T + S < 2R [10].
Evolutionary game theory applies mathematical and
computational techniques to study the evolution of co-
operation. For an important review on co-evolutionary
processes, see [11]. It is shown that choice and refusal of
partners accelerates the emergence of cooperation [12].
Memory is a prerequisite for engaging in reciprocity and
also for partner selection on the basis of past encoun-
ters. In memory-based Prisoner’s Dilemma Games, each
player can keep track of only a limited number of the
previous rounds for all of its partners [13]. This lim-
ited number is defined as the memory length [14, 15].
Tit-for-Tat, the winner of the Axelrod’s tournament, is
a memory-one strategy. It starts with cooperation and
afterwards imitates the last action of its partners [10].
Thus the memory length of agents using Tit-for-Tat is
one, even though they keep track of all of their part-
ners. Dunbar’s number indicates a cognitive limit to the
number of individuals with whom one can maintain sta-
ble relationships [16]. We think that the ability to keep
track of all potential game partners is not always possi-
ble. This may be thought as a natural consequence of
huge amount of game partners or a very limited mem-
ory size to be informed of all. The concept of memory
in Prisoner’s Dilemma, is generally explored in terms of
historical time-dependency of previous rounds [17–19].
Differently, from our perspective, the term memory size
indicates the number of potential game partners one can
keep track of. In our model, agents store a very brief in-
formation about the general behavior of a limited num-
ber of their partners. This information will be used to
distinguish defectors from cooperators.
Evolutionary psychologists demonstrated that social
exchange in a group requires the existence of some mech-
anisms for detecting cheaters, but do not require any
mechanisms for detecting altruists [20]. Similarly, in our
previous work we found that it is crucial for attention
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FIG. 1: Payoff matrices.
to be focused on defectors in order to foster cooperation
when agents have insufficient memory size [9]. That is,
attention should be allocated in such a way that agents
should keep remembering defectors, and forget prefer-
entially cooperators whenever memory is exhausted. In
Ref [9], memory size does not differ from one player to
another and there exists only two type of players such
as pure cooperators and pure defectors. We will use a
similar attention mechanism focusing on defectors. In
this study, we will introduce heterogeneity to our work
by allowing agents to have different memory sizes and
strategies. We will investigate how the characteristics of
agents evolve from generation to generation.
The essence of how selfish beings manage to cooper-
ate is captured by the payoff matrix of the IPD game.
Axelrod used the fixed payoff matrix given in Fig. 1c for
his tournament [10]. A natural extension would be to
investigate the impact of different payoff entries. Many
studies use payoff matrices with positive payoffs. Some
works on negative payoffs are also done. To this end,
some researchers prefer to fix the two selected entries of
the payoff matrix and explore the effect of the change in
the other two entries [3, 21, 22]. In the so-called Dona-
tion game, given in Fig. 1d, cooperation corresponds to
offering the other player a benefit b at a personal cost
c and defection corresponds to offering nothing. Nowak
has investigated the effect of these two essential param-
eters for various situations [3]. This is a very agreeable
representation, but it requires P = 0. So it does not allow
to study the dynamics of cooperation where the punish-
ment payoff P is positive or negative. In Ref [21], Epstein
investigated the case of negative sucker and punishment
payoffs for a special case of S = −T and P = −R, given
in Fig. 1e. We also want to study the case where receiving
a defection leads to negative payoffs. Differently, we in-
terpret the case of S < P < 0 as the presence of threat.
For S < P < 0, the decrease in the negative values of
S and P corresponds to the increasing level of threat.
From our perspective, non-negative values of S and P
corresponds to the absence of threat. To investigate the
effect of threat, we propose to use a more general para-
metric payoff matrices of the form Fig. 1b which covers
the family of payoff matrices of the form given in Fig. 1d
and Fig. 1e.
This article is structured as follows: In the next sec-
tion we explain our motivation and in Sec. III we present
our agent-based model and give the technical details of
the simulations for a generic payoff matrix. In Sec. IV,
we provide the results for two specific payoff matrices:
(i) one with all non-negative entries, and (ii) the other
with negative entries for sucker and punishment payoffs.
In Sec. V, we generalized the payoff matrices with two pa-
rameters. Finally, in Sec. VI we summarize our findings
and construct some analogies with various disciplines.
II. MOTIVATION
Consider selfish agents playing evolutionary IPD game.
Assume that the fitness of agent is correlated with its ac-
cumulated payoffs. Then, in order to increase its fitness,
a selfish agent tries to maximize its gain at every single
round of the game. Suppose agents have the right to
choose or refuse to play. If all the entries of the payoff
matrix are non-negative, should an agent choose to play
with every opponent whether it is a defector or not?
Agents with myopic view may prefer immediate posi-
tive outcomes in the short-term at the expense of longer-
term outcomes. When interacting with an opponent
brings relatively low payoff, the agent will accumulate
less payoffs compared to that opponent and at the end,
the agent will have a lower chance to reproduce. This is
the case of cooperator playing against defector. If only
cooperators could have find a way to distinguish defec-
tors from cooperators and refuse to play with the defec-
tors, then the cooperators can outcompete the isolated
3defectors. So the macro-level dynamics of the population
depends on the mixture of agents: how cooperative and
with whom willing to play they are.
It is not possible for cooperation to flourish in a well-
mixed population without any mechanism that give co-
operators the ability to quarantine defectors. Spatial
structure can promote cooperation by introducing phys-
ical barriers against interaction with defectors. Static
networks lack the ability for modeling the dynamical in-
teractions [23]. So, recent advances make emphasis on
the co-evolution of strategy and environment [11]. In
this study, we follow a different path in order to promote
cooperation. In lieu of considering spatially structured
population in physical space, we will consider concep-
tually structured populations. Agents will have mental
representations of other agents and they will have the
ability to choose with whom to interact. Our proposi-
tion fits nicely to the research line of conditional strate-
gies [24–26]. In our model, agents interact with all except
the ones that they perceive and remember as defectors.
Thus, memory plays the role of conceptual barriers for
interaction with defectors. If we consider payoff matrices
with negative values, for S and P , then the dynamics
may become more complicated but the need for the re-
fusal of defectors becomes more clear. For a cooperator,
there was a risk of not gaining (S = 0) but now losing
points becomes also a possibility (S < 0). Whenever P
also becomes negative, defectors also face the risk of los-
ing points. To identify the characteristic of the opponent
and if it is defector not to play with it becomes an es-
sential asset especially when receiving a defection leads
to negative payoffs. We will consider risk of losing points
as threat. Hence payoff matrices with negative entries,
for sucker and punishment payoffs, are considered to be
games with threat.
Our main research question, in this article, will be the
following. What is the effect of increasing level of threat
on the co-evolutionary dynamics of memory and cooper-
ation?
III. MODEL
We propose an evolutionary game, where generations
do not overlap. In our model, there are N agents playing
IPD game within the generation. At the end of certain
number of rounds the generation is terminated, and all
the agents of the old generation are removed. Before the
old agents are removed, they reproduce according to their
fitnesses. Roulette wheel selection is applied N times to
pick agents that will reproduce. Hence, the population
size is kept constant at N . We set N = 100.
A. Rounds
Agents interact and try to increase their accumulated
payoffs by means of playing a modified IPD [10]. In
each round, two agents are selected uniformly at ran-
dom and given the chance to play. Each selected agent
has to decide whether to choose or to refuse to play with
the given opponent. If at least one of them refuses to
play, no playing takes place and the round is completed,
hence their scores do not change. If both agents choose to
play, then they play the usual Prisoner’s Dilemma game.
Each agent selects its action of either cooperate or defect.
According to their joint actions, each collects its payoff
based on the generic payoff matrix given in Fig. 1a. The
payoff collected is added to the cumulative payoff, called
score, and the round is completed.
We want every pair of agents to be selected on average
τ times. Therefore each generation lasts τ
(
N
2
)
rounds.
We use τ = 30.
B. Choice and refusal of partners.
Agents have probabilistic behavior. An agent i sim-
ply chooses to defect with probability ρi, called defection
rate, or to cooperate with 1 − ρi. The defection rate of
an agent is a property that never changes.
Choice and refusal to play is based on the agent’s sub-
jective perception of the opponent as a defector or a coop-
erator. The agent refuses to play with an opponent if the
opponent is perceived as a defector. In order to decide
whether the opponent is defector, agent uses its mem-
ory. The agent keeps track of the previous rounds with
the opponents. That is, for every opponent, it keeps two
numbers, namely, the total number of rounds played with
the opponent and in how many of them the opponent has
defected. The ratio of the number of received defections
to the number of total rounds is called perceived defec-
tion rate. The opponent is perceived as defector if its
perceived defection rate is fifty percent or more. Oth-
erwise, the opponent is perceived as cooperator. As a
third case, if there is no history about the opponent, it
is considered as if it is cooperator. Namely, the default
decision is to play.
We should give some intuition about agent’s possible
misperceptions due to the small number of interactions,
at this point. Different agents can perceive the same
agent differently, at the same time. Suppose agent i has
a low defection rate which is greater than zero. Then,
in most of the games it plays, it will cooperate and in a
very few of them it will defect. Therefore it is expected
that most of the agents consider it as “cooperator”. But
it is still possible that some agents can perceive it as a
“defector” and refuse to play with it again. This may
happen due to the small number of interactions with i,
in which i happened to defect more than cooperate. In
statistics, it is known that the small sample size may
not be a good representative of a probability distribu-
tion. But our agents do not know it, like most of the
people [27].
4C. Memory
Remembering the history of the opponents calls for
memory for each agent. Every agent has different size of
memory. Let Mi denotes the number of opponents agent
i can keep track of. The ratio µi = Mi/N is called the
memory ratio of agent i. If Mi ≥ N , then agents have
enough space to recall every agent. Since this case is not
interesting, we investigate the case where Mi ≤ N for all
i. That is, agents do not have enough memory space to
store the history of all opponents. Hence µi ∈ [0, 1].
If the number of rounds in a generation is big enough,
an agent encounters with almost all agents and in order
to keep the history of each opponent, it requires memory
size of N . Suppose agents have limited memory size, i.e.,
M < N . Then after M different opponents, there is no
room left for the M + 1th opponent. This requires a se-
lective attention mechanism. Agents should decide which
agents to keep in memory and which agent to forget. Our
previous study indicates that it is a better strategy to fo-
cus on defectors rather then cooperators [9]. So if there
are memory spaces reserved for cooperators, select a co-
operator. If there is no cooperator left, then select a
defector. Then forget the selected opponent and use this
reclaimed space for the new opponent. Both cooperator
or defector selections are done by uniformly at random.
D. Fitness
In evolutionary games, agents reproduce proportional
to their fitness. We define fitness as a function of scores.
Agents of a new generation start with zero scores. As
they play, the payoffs obtained are added to the score. In
the traditional Prisoner’s Dilemma game, the payoffs are
all non-negative such as (S, P,R, T ) = (0, 1, 3, 5). Hence
playing will not decreases the score. In this study we
also consider payoff matrices with negative entries, too.
In the case of negative payoffs, the scores of agents may
decrease and negative scores are possible. Therefore, us-
ing scores directly as fitnesses will not work. The map-
ping the scores to fitness values requires attention. We
adjust the scores by subtracting the minimum score from
all. After this, adjusted scores become all non-negative.
Then obtain the normalize score by dividing the adjusted
scores to the sum of all adjusted scores. Then, use the
normalized scores as the fitness for reproduction. Note
that the agent with the minimum score has the normal-
ized score of zero. Hence it does not reproduce.
E. Reproduction
The reproduction is asexual. Each child has exactly
one parent. The genotype of an agent i, is the pair
(µi, ρi). A child gets the exact copy of the genotype of
its parent if there is no mutation. With probability of r,
called mutation rate, there is a mutation. When there is
a mutation, only one of the entries, selected at random,
in the genotype is replaced with a new number drawed
from a uniform distribution of [0, 1]. We use r = 0.05.
F. Visualization
Note that there is a useful visualization for genotype
(µi, ρi). Agents can be represented by points on the
unit square of the µ-ρ plane where x-axis is the mem-
ory ratio µ and y-axis is the defection rate ρ. The point
(µi, ρi) displays the genotype of the i’th agent. The av-
erage defection rate and the average memory ratio of
the current population are given by µ = 1N
∑N
i=1 µi and
ρ = 1N
∑N
i=1 ρi, respectively. We can picture the aver-
age genotype (µ,ρ), as a point on that phase plane as in
Fig. 2.
G. Initialization and termination
Once an initial generation is formed, system runs from
one generation to the next with the given dynamics. The
parameters of the agents of the initial generation are set
randomly using uniform distributions. That is, for each
agent i the values for the genes µi and ρi are set using
a uniform distribution over [0, 1]. The number of gener-
ations, before the simulations are terminated, is another
model parameter. We terminate our simulations after
500 generations.
IV. RESULTS
We run simulations using various payoff matrices. Ini-
tial population starts with an average genotype close to
(0.5, 0.5). Tracking the values of (µ, ρ) pairs from gener-
ation to generation will make us see the co-evolution of
cooperation and memory, as in Fig. 2.
A. Absence of threat
We have discussed that payoff matrices with negative
entries cause threat to the agents. We refer the case of
non-negative payoffs, i.e., 0 ≤ S < P < R < T , as ab-
sence of threat. In the first set of simulations, we used
the standard payoff values of (S, P,R, T ) = (0, 1, 3, 5).
An averaged trajectory over 50 different realizations of
the same initial population can be seen in Fig. 2. Two
dynamics are observed. (i) Average memory size tends
to decrease independent of the average defection rate of
the population. Neither cooperation nor defection favor
greater memory size when there is no threat. (ii) Aver-
age defection rate decreases if memory size is high and
increases if it is low. Average defection rate ρ decreases
at the beginning since initial value of µ = 0.5 is relatively
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FIG. 2: Co-evolution of average memory ratio µ¯ and
average defection rate ρ¯ through generations.
(S, P,R, T ) = (0, 1, 3, 5).
high. Interestingly, there is an unconditional decrease for
µ. Once average memory ratio µ, becomes small enough,
average defection rate ρ starts to increase. Memory size
has a negative effect on defection rate, in other words,
memory protects cooperation. Without memory, i.e.,
(µ → 0), cooperation becomes vulnerable and defection
succeeds, i.e., (ρ→ 1). The average genotype of the pop-
ulation gradually reaches to a point very close to (0, 1).
That is, agents become memoryless and defective when
there is no threat.
It is known that evolution may lead to unexpected
paths. The observation of the unconditional decrease of
the memory size is totally unexpected. To understand it,
first consider a population that is composed of defectors
only. Is it better for defectors to have greater memory
size? The answer is no, as long as punishment payoff P
is greater than zero. The reason is as follows: defectors
with high memory size lose punishment payoff P > 0,
just because they remember and refuse other defectors.
Thus they end up with lower fitness and they are elim-
inated throughout the evolution. Consider the second
extreme case where the population is composed of coop-
erators only. This case is a bit trickier. Previously we
determined how agents perceive the world. Perception
is open to mistakes as it is the case for real life. A co-
operator with a low defection rate can be perceived as
a defector, just because it is happened to defect more
than cooperate within a small number of interactions.
As a result of this misperception, high memory size can
cause to avoid engaging rounds with agents whose inten-
tion is mostly cooperate. Cooperators with high memory
size end up with lower fitnesses. The relative abundance
of the cooperators with high memory in the subsequent
generations decreases, and the relative abundance of the
cooperators with low memory increases. This manifests
itself as a reduction in the average memory size, µ.
The surprising downside of having a greater memory
size is isolation, which leads to a deficient fitness. Thus,
by means of mutations, subsequent generations get rid of
their memory in the absence of threat. Without memory,
defectors invade the subsequent generations.
B. Presence of threat
We investigate the outcomes of an alternative formula-
tion of negative payoffs, as in Ref [21]. For S = 0, refusing
or playing with a defector is apparently indifferent for a
cooperator. Once S becomes negative, picture changes.
From the perspective of defectors, it is still better to play
whatever the opponent type is, as long as S < 0 ≤ P .
When P becomes negative, defectors have to be careful,
too. It is known that evolution is about the survival of
the most suited organisms for the current environmen-
tal conditions. When we use a different payoff matrix,
environment differs and dynamics dramatically change.
Let’s define aggressive defection as an harmful act that
reduces the score of the agents that are subjected to it.
PD game under aggressive defection can be given with
an additional constraint of S < P < 0. Now, receiving
a defection results in negative values and it hurts. Thus
having a greater memory size may become advantageous,
in contrast to the case of non-negative payoff matrix.
In the presence of threat, two dynamics begin to com-
pete at the evolutionary level. (i) Tendency to increase
memory size, in order to maintain self-protection when
average defection rate gets higher. (ii) Tendency to de-
crease memory size, to avoid self-isolation when average
defection rate gets lower. These two dynamics can give
rise to oscillatory behaviors. In Fig. 3, we display the dy-
namics of a single realization for a biased payoff matrix
of (S, P,R, T ) = (−7,−6, 4, 5). At generation 0 in Fig. 3,
simulation starts with a randomly generated initial pop-
ulation whose average memory ratio is relatively high,
µ = 0.5. Agents with high memory size can protect them-
selves from defection. Thus defectors incur isolation and
their fitness diminishes, ρ → 0. Eventually, cooperators
with high memory size fill the population. When almost
all agents turn out to be cooperator, around generation
20 in Fig. 3, misperception becomes an issue. High mem-
ory size may block interactions among cooperators and
this is the reason why evolution prefers cooperators with
smaller memory size, µ→ 0. Population without a valu-
able memory provides an excellent opportunity not to be
missed by mutant defectors. Thus population starts to
be filled by defectors and the average defection rate of
the population increases around generation 50 in Fig. 3.
Only cooperators with high memory size can resist to
defectors, let’s call them skeptic cooperators. If there
exists still some critical number of skeptic cooperators,
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FIG. 3: Co-evolution under aggressive defection for a single realization. x-axis represents the generation steps and
y-axis represents the average genotype of the population. (S, P,R, T ) = (−7,−6, 4, 5).
resistance can take place and defectors can be outcom-
peted. That is, cooperators with high memory size again
fill the population, as it is seen around generation 60.
This cyclic behavior repeats itself until relative abun-
dance of the skeptic cooperators becomes inadequate to
resist defectors. In that case, defectors can invade the
population as it is seen around generation 150.
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FIG. 4: Co-evolution under aggressive defection for a
single realization. The same data, displayed in Fig. 3,
graphed on a phase plane. (S, P,R, T ) = (−7,−6, 4, 5).
We displayed the same data on the phase plane in
Fig. 4. Under aggressive defection, defectors with lower
memory size, have no chance to survive. Thus, the av-
erage genotype of the population moves towards a point
close to (µ,ρ)→ (1, 1) on the phase plane. That point
corresponds to a defective population with high memory
size. Population genotype can stuck around this point
or it can escape to continue its trending cyclic behavior.
That depends not only the payoff matrix but also the
dynamic composition of the heterogeneous population at
any given time. In the next section, we will try to explore
the effect of payoff matrix structure on the co-evolution
of memory size and cooperation.
V. THE EFFECT OF PAYOFF MATRIX
STRUCTURE
Each payoff matrix has its own dynamics and it is very
hard to make generalizations. We need to identify cor-
rectly the principal driving forces in our model, and how
they will affect the co-evolution of memory and coopera-
tion. To this end, we will reformulate the payoff matrix.
Note that the payoff matrices given in Fig. 1d and Fig. 1e
have some common properties. Within both matrices the
column differences are equal, i.e., R − S = T − P . The
row differences are also kept equal, i.e., T −R = P − S.
If we generalize these differences we obtain two factors
that are critical in the dynamics: (i) how much it is dan-
gerous to receive a defection, i.e. the column differences,
and (ii) how much it is tempting to defect, i.e., the row
differences. Thus we introduce the following two princi-
pal factors of threat and greed.
• Threat factor, α. How to measure the differ-
ence between receiving a cooperation and receiv-
ing a defection? The answer can be found in the
payoff matrix seen in Fig. 1a. For an agent that
chooses to cooperate, the difference between receiv-
ing a cooperation and receiving a defection is given
by R − S. For an agent that chooses to defect, it
is given by T − P . For simplification, consider the
case of R − S = T − P = αT where T > 0 and
α > 0, as it is shown in Fig. 5. Now irrespective
of the chosen action, receiving a defection causes
an extra cost of αT in terms of payoffs when it is
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FIG. 5: The visual representation of payoffs on a
number line. Note the fact that α > 1 makes S < P < 0
and β > 1 makes R < 0.
compared to receiving a cooperation. It is worth to
emphasize that α = 1 is a critical value. For α < 1,
P is positive. At α = 1, P becomes equal to 0 and
for α > 1, we have P < 0. Thus α > 1 corresponds
to the case of aggressive defection (S < P < 0).
Hence we call α as the threat factor. For α > 1,
increasing α means increasing level of threat. On
the other hand, α ≤ 1 means absence of threat.
• Greed factor, β. How to measure the difference
between taking the two actions of defection and
cooperation? When the opponent is cooperating,
the difference between defecting and cooperating is
given by T − R. When the opponent is defecting,
the same difference is given by P−S. Again for sim-
plification consider the case of T−R = P−S = βT
where T > 0 and β > 0, as it is shown in Fig. 5.
Now irrespective of the opponent’s action, choosing
to defect makes an extra benefit of βT in terms of
payoffs when it is compared to choosing to coop-
erate. Thus, we call β as the greed factor. When
β = 0, playing cooperation or defection makes no
difference. But whenever β gets larger, defection
becomes more tempting. Since the case of β > 1
makes R < 0, it turns out to be uninteresting.
This is because, when mutual cooperation payoff
R is also negative, there will be no motivation for
choosing to cooperate.
As an interpretation, choosing to defect brings an extra
benefit of βT (the row differences in the payoff matrix)
and receiving a defection causes an extra cost of αT (the
column differences).
A. Threat Game
Starting with a fixed positive value for T , we can
rewrite S, P , and R in terms α, β and T . That makes
S = (1−α−β)T , P = (1−α)T , and R = (1−β)T . IPD
condition of S < P < R < T implies that 0 < β < α.
Since all payoff values are multiples of T , the score of
any agent will be also a factor of T . When the nor-
malized score is calculated, T factor cancels out and we
have expression in terms of α and β only. Therefore,
without loss of generality, we can take T = 1. Our ex-
tensive simulations for different values of T ∈ {5, 50, 100}
have confirmed that the dynamics are not dependent on
T . Finally, we have the normalized payoff matrix given
in Fig. 1b, which has only two parameters, namely, the
threat factor α and the greed factor β. We call this spe-
cial form of the IPD game as Threat game.
This family of payoff matrices is a special case of all
possible payoff matrices, yet its is an important general-
ization which covers the donation game and also matrices
that Epstein used. (i) The payoff matrix structure of the
Donation game, given in Fig. 1d, can be thought as a
subset of Threat game for b and c as column and row dif-
ferences, respectively. The Donation game lies on the line
segment of α = 1 and 0 < β = cb < 1 in the α-β plain in
Fig. 6. (ii) Likewise, the payoff matrix structures, given
in Fig. 1e, used by Epstein in Ref [21], can be represented
by T + R and T − R as column and row differences, re-
spectively. Hence they correspond to the points on the
line segment of α+ β = 2 again for 0 < β < 1.
B. Observations
We investigate the effect of increasing level of threat
and greed factors on the co-evolutionary dynamics of
memory size and cooperation for T = 1. Fig. 6 visu-
alizes how µ and ρ change as a function of (α, β) pairs.
In both figures of Fig. 6a and Fig. 6b, x-axis is the threat
factor α ∈ [0, 5] and y-axis is the greed factor β ∈ [0, 1.1].
Both α and β have incremental steps of 0.1 in their given
ranges. We omitted the case of α < β in Fig. 6 since IPD
condition of S < P < R < T implies that 0 < β < α.
But we showed the results for α = β and β = 0 to see the
limiting conditions. The values of µ and ρ are the aver-
ages over 20 realizations. We have only considered the
average genotypes of the last 100 subsequent generations.
That is from generation number 400 to 500.
1. Evolution of memory
In Fig. 6a, we show the effect of threat and greed fac-
tors on the evolution of memory size. For the evolution
of memory, α = 1 is critical. P becomes negative for
α > 1, as it is shown in Fig. 5. So the change of α value
from smaller than 1 to greater than 1 corresponds to the
change from absence of threat to presence of threat. In
Fig. 6a, we observe that the average memory size ex-
hibits a major transformation from its lowest values to
its highest values when α becomes greater than 1. This
shows clearly how threat fosters greater memory size. We
observe no direct impact of greed factor on the memory
size.
2. Evolution of cooperation
In Fig. 6b, we show the effect of threat and greed fac-
tors on the evolution of cooperation. For β = 0, agents
have no preference neither for defection nor for coopera-
tion. Cooperation may succeed for β = 0. But it does not
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(b) Average defection rate ρ as a function of α and β
FIG. 6: The effect of increasing level of threat and greed factors on the co-evolutionary dynamics of memory size
and cooperation. The cases for α < β are omitted since they do not fulfill the conditions of the IPD game.
fulfill the conditions of IPD. As greed factor β gets larger,
obviously it becomes harder to resist to the temptation
to defect and cooperation vanishes totally for β > 0.5.
This is also true even if agents have high memory size.
It seems that threat has a non-linear effect on coopera-
tion. To better understand the underlying dynamics, we
should reconsider the interdependence between threat,
memory and cooperation. Memory has a positive effect
on cooperation, but cooperation has a negative effect on
memory.
• The role of memory is to block interactions with
agents that are perceived as defectors. The increase
in memory size can be thought as an introduction
of (conceptual) barriers against interaction with de-
fectors. When memory size grows, defectors incur
isolation. Defectors can not gather enough fitness
values for reproduction and they are eliminated.
• High memory size surprisingly raises the risk of self-
isolation, especially in a population mostly com-
posed of coopeartors. Cooperators can be per-
ceived as defectors due to the small number of in-
teractions in which they happened to defect more
than cooperate. As a result of misperceptions, co-
operators with high memory size can refuse to in-
teract with other cooperators, hence they end up
with lower fitness values. In the subsequent gener-
ations, cooperators get rid of their memory.
Threat calls for high memory size.
• In the absence of threat, α ≤ 1, receiving a de-
fection brings non-negative payoffs, 0 ≤ S < P .
In this case, refusing a defector, due to the high
memory size, turns out to be disadvantageous. So
agents with high memory size are again eliminated
throughout the evolution.
• In the presence of threat, α > 1, receiving a defec-
tion brings negative payoffs, S < P < 0. This time,
refusing a defector and having a high memory size
become advantageous. So average memory size has
a tendency to increase in the presence of threat.
Increasing level of threat, primarily increases the memory
size, which, in turn, fosters cooperation. But further
increase in the level of threat, can not help cooperation.
In the next section we discuss the limits to cooperation.
3. Drawing the boundaries of cooperation
We have made further simulations for greater number
of generations. We have observed that an increase in
the number of generations, up to a certain point, has a
positive effect on cooperation. This raises the question
whether there is a limit to cooperation. So we decided to
make an analytical effort to draw the boundaries of coop-
eration, by simplifying our model as much as possible for
the benefit of cooperators. Let’s think that there exists
only pure cooperators, that always cooperate, and pure
defectors, that always defect, in the population. In order
9to favor cooperators, suppose memory ratio µi = 1 for
all agents. So agents will remember the past actions of
all their opponents. Suppose also mutation is prohibited.
Hence, both cooperators and defectors will always be cau-
tious against other defectors, throughout the evolution-
ary process. Since agents have enough memory they will
play utmost one round with one particular defector and
refuse to play with it afterwards.
Suppose there are d ∈ [0, N ] defectors in the popula-
tion. In our model, each pair of agents are matched τ
times on the average. So a cooperator will play τ times
with (N−d−1) other cooperators (and receive the reward
payoff 1 − β) but it will play only once with d defectors
(and receive the sucker payoff 1 − α − β). Hence, the
average performance of a particular cooperator equals to
the following.
PC = τ(N − d− 1)(1− β) + d(1− α− β)
The average performance of a particular defector can be
obtained in a similar fashion. A defector will play only
once with (N − d) cooperators (and receive the tempta-
tion payoff 1) and will again play only once with (d− 1)
other defectors (and receive the punishment payoff 1−α).
PD = (N − d) + (d− 1)(1− α).
In order to have PC > PD, α should satisfy
α < (N − d− 1)(τ(1− β)− 1)− dβ. (1)
Extremely beneficial conditions for cooperation can be
achieved by setting β = 0. Even in this condition, pop-
ulation can resist to a single (d = 1) defector, up to a
certain point. By setting d = 1 and β = 0 in Eq. 1, we
obtain α1 and α2 given as
α < α1 = (N − 2)(τ − 1) < Nτ = α2.
For greater values of α > α2, irrespective of the genera-
tion number and the greed factor β, it becomes impossi-
ble to resist defectors. Absence of greed (β = 0) makes
cooperation and defection indifferent in terms of payoffs,
see Fig. 1b. Then why pure cooperators (ρ = 0) fail and
pure defectors (ρ = 1) rise for α > α2? This is simply
because a defector can not receive a defection from itself.
So cooperators receive 1 more defection than defectors
does. This difference becomes impossible to compensate
when the level of threat α is greater than the average
number of rounds τ with each opponent, multiplied by
number of agents N , multiplied by the maximum payoff
per round T = 1. This was an excessive simplification to
show that there exists a limit to cooperation.
Our bounds for α are not tight. The α2 value is 3000
for τ = 30 and N = 100. We test the bounds by sim-
ulations, in which populations are not composed of only
pure cooperators and pure defectors with memory ratio
of 1 but of heterogenous agents with various defection
rates and memory ratios. We obtained much more mod-
est values of α2. We have obtained α2 = 10 for generation
number 500, and α2 = 20 for generation number 2500.
Above these α2 values we do not observe any cooperation.
4. Co-evolution of memory and cooperation
Necessity is the mother of invention. We see a posi-
tive function of threat in having a greater memory size.
On the other hand, greater memory size raises the risk
of self-isolation. Threat and misperceptions among co-
operators surprisingly cause a second source of dilemma
on the memory size. Thus not only cooperation but also
memory size constitutes a dilemma in our model. We can
summarize the resulting dynamics of our model in three
predominant categories.
(i) In the absence of threat (α ≤ 1), greater memory
size is unfavorable to evolutionary success. And co-
operation collapses without memory. Thus, the av-
erage genotype of the population moves to a point
close to (µ, ρ) = (0, 1). Fig. 2 shows the triumph of
memoryless defection over time, when there is no
threat.
(ii) In the presence of an appropriate level of threat
(1 < α < α2) and under low greed factor (β < 0.5),
the trajectory of the evolving population can ex-
hibit emergent oscillatory dynamics. Memory size
acts like an immune response of the subsequent gen-
erations. Fig. 3 helps us to visualize the emerg-
ing oscillatory dynamics for a single realization,
in the presence of an appropriate level of threat.
Memory crashes when defection rate is low, but
spikes up as a response to growing defection rate
in the generation, then crashes again and recover
again depending on the average defection rate of
the subsequent generations. Not individual agents,
but populations from generations to generations
evolved to develop some kind of protection mech-
anism against aggressive defection. This is an un-
programmed functionality that emerged via evolu-
tionary dynamics.
(iii) In the presence of threat (α > 1) and for high greed
factor (β > 0.5) the average genotype of the popu-
lation moves towards a point close to (µ, ρ) = (1, 1)
which corresponds to a defective population with
high memory size. This is also true in the presence
of an extreme threat (α > α2). As α gets larger
and approaches to α2, defection starts to cause an
extreme damage and it gets harder for cooperators
to resist.
To our conclusion, the dose of the threat makes the re-
sistance for cooperation, especially when the greed factor
is low. Lastly, to understand the impact of attention, we
compared the dynamics under selective attention (forget
preferentially cooperators) and the dynamics without at-
tention (forget at random without preference). It seems
like attention favors cooperation and disfavors defection,
especially for moderate values of threat and greed factors.
Attention can only make a difference when memory size
is limited. For higher threat and greed factors memory
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size gets very close to its maximum value and memory be-
comes sufficient to remember all opponents that, in turn,
makes attention less critical. Nevertheless, we think that
the effect of attention on the co-evolutionary dynamics of
memory and cooperation requires a research of its own.
We leave it as a future work.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the research of cooperation, the effect of negative
mutual punishment payoff, P < 0, is usually omitted,
as in the case of the Donation Game. Yet there are
some studies with negative payoffs for receiving a defec-
tion. Our model shares with Epstein, the effect of neg-
ative payoffs in the emergence of cooperation [21]. But
it differs in many other respects. First, our model al-
lows agents to have varying memory size and defection
rate, whereas Epstein’s model allows only pure coopera-
tors and pure defectors with zero-memory. The structure
of a system, determines who interacts with whom and
causes its dynamic behavior. In our model, agents can
select their partners and memory has a critical role, as it
is used to hinder interactions with defectors. In Ref [21],
it is only the spatial aspects of the environment which
hinders cooperators from interacting with defectors. In
other words, Epstein used physical barriers to avoid in-
teractions with defectors, while we have used conceptual
barriers for it. Instead of studying cooperation under
fixed payoff matrix structure, we proposed to reformulate
the payoff matrix structure of IPD game by introducing
threat and greed factors, and showed their effect on the
co-evolution of memory and cooperation.
We observe that the greater memory size is unfavor-
able to evolutionary success when there is no threat. One
can find this, initially, deeply counterintuitive and not
realistic. But there are cases where species lost their
brains as a result of evolution. According to Frank Hirth,
in their ancient evolutionary past, sea sponges did have
neurons [28]. Some extremely simple animals, such as
sea squirts, simplify their brains during their lifetimes.
Sea squirt has a nervous system in order to navigate in
the sea. Its only goal is to find a suitable rock to live
on for the rest of its life. When it implants on a rock,
the first thing it does is to digest its nervous system.
Without a problem to solve, there is no need to waste
energy on a brain. In order for evolution to promote
increased brain size, its benefits, e.g. against predation
threat, must outweigh the high energetic costs [29]. One
of the most striking example related to the evolution of
brain size belongs to humans. In the past 20.000 years,
the human brain has shrunk by about the size of a ten-
nis ball [30]. Nobody knows exactly why. According to
a leading theory, the incredible decline in human brain
size is a by-product of domesticity. The shift from the
threatening lifestyle of hunter-gatherers to the highly co-
operative and more secure lifestyle of agricultural society
has led to the reduction in brain size. Our results support
this theory.
We have shown the positive effect of an appropriate
level of threat in having a greater memory size which, in
turn, favors cooperation. This finding is in parallel with
other forms of delicate balance (for the level of environ-
mental harshness [31] and for the level of punishment
fines [32]) within which cooperation thrives best in spa-
tial evolutionary games. It is possible to make analogies
with two different scientific results from immunology and
experimental psychology. It is thought that the immune
system functions by making distinction between self and
non-self. This viewpoint is renewed with the idea that
the immune system is more concerned with entities that
do damage than with those that are foreign [33]. Ac-
tually, threat calls for taking countermeasures against
the would-be-exploiter. Experimental evidence from psy-
chology has shown that the cooperation typically col-
lapses in the absence of sanctioning possibilities [34]. The
threat of punishment is the key to maintain and promote
cooperation [35, 36]. To conclude, in order for coopera-
tion to emerge, selfish beings need to be exposed to an
appropriate level of threat. When defection is harmless
agents tend to defect and when defection cause an ex-
treme damage, cooperators have no chance to survive.
We observe that the conditions for the emergence of co-
operation are very subtle. To increase the immunity of
cooperation, differentiation of cooperators or some kind
of collective memory can be incorporated to our model
as a future work.
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